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I
n articles published in 1994 and 1995, I proposed 
that the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) be 
modified to allow banks to trade their CRA obliga-
tions with one another in a manner analogous to 
cap-and-trade regimes used to address environmental 
pollution.1 As in the environmental protection context, a 
tradable obligation approach to the CRA has the poten-
tial to enhance the provision of financial services to low- 
and moderate-income communities at lower cost than 
does the current command-and-control approach. This 
article revisits that proposal in light of developments in 
the financial services sector and in community develop-
ment over the past decade, and assesses whether the 
proposal warrants reconsideration today.2 I conclude that 
the proposal does warrant reconsideration, but I also 
discuss a number of empirical and practical questions 
that should be addressed before one can conclude that 
the proposal would in fact enhance the effectiveness of 
the CRA. 
Although the objective of the CRA is to induce 
banks to provide services they otherwise would not 
provide to low- and moderate-income communities, 
the act is unclear with respect to whether it is intended 




to address market failures that impair the provision of 
financial services in these communities, or to redistribute 
wealth from bank shareholders to residents of these 
communities, or both.3 A “tradable obligation” approach 
to the CRA is potentially attractive with respect to both 
rationales.
I.  The Tradable CRA Obligation Proposal:  
A Market-Oriented Approach
The current CRA regime follows the conventional 
command-and-control approach to regulation. Banks are 
in effect required to serve low- and moderate-income 
communities throughout the areas in which they do 
business.4 As discussed in Part II, this approach has 
drawbacks. Some banks may be less able to provide 
the same service to CRA-qualified communities than 
are other banks. From a social welfare point of view, 
banks that can provide the same service at lowest 
cost should be the ones that serve these communities. 
In addition, the CRA’s mandate that a bank provide 
services throughout its area of operation (referred to as 







Community Reinvestment Act and the Economics of Regulatory Policy,” Fordham Urban Law Journal, April 2002; Lawrence J. White, 
“Focusing More on Outputs and on Markets: What Financial Regulation Can Learn from Progress in Other Policy Areas” (November 2006). 
Networks	Financial	Institute	Policy	Brief	No.	2006-PB-18,	available	at	http://ssrn.com/abstract=947895;	“The	Community	Reinvestment	Act:	
Thirty Years of Accomplishments, but Challenges Remain,” statement of Lawrence J. White before the Financial Services Committee of the U.S. 
House of Representatives, February 13, 2008.
3  Congress’s stated purpose in enacting the CRA was to have banks “meet the credit needs of the local communities in which they are chartered 
consistent with the safe and sound operation of such institutions.” U.S. Code, Title 12, Section 2901(b).
4	 Technically,	the	CRA	is	not	a	requirement.	It	requires	the	bank	regulatory	agencies	to	assess	whether	a	bank	is	“meeting	the	credit	needs	of	its	
entire	community,	including	low-	and	moderate-income	neighborhoods,	consistent	with	the	safe	and	sound	operation	of	such	institution”	and	to	
take that assessment into account in ruling on the bank’s applications for mergers, branch openings, or expanded activities. Because banks may 
make such applications in the future and because a poor CRA rating has reputational costs for a bank, most banks treat the CRA as a require-
ment.	For	simplicity	I	will	refer	to	the	CRA	as	a	requirement	here.Revisiting the CRA: Perspectives on the Future of the Community Reinvestment Act
76
efficiencies that may be available through specialization 
in particular neighborhoods.
 The tradable obligation approach would have two 
core elements. First, all banks would be assigned an-
nual quotas of CRA obligations. These quotas would be 
stated in objective and verifiable terms for each type of 
financial product or service—for example, a quota for 
lending, a quota for investment, and a quota for other 
services. This approach is quite different from the current 
approach to CRA enforcement, which relies on broad 
standards and ex post evaluation by bank examiners. 
Reportedly, the increased specificity in CRA regula-
tions that occurred in 1995 was difficult to achieve and 
may have exhausted the potential for specificity under 
the current structure of the CRA.5 Nonetheless, with a 
tradable obligation regime, greater specificity in regu-
lations may be possible. Under the CRA as currently 
administered, different standards apply depending on 
whether a bank is large or small, and on whether it is a 
retail, wholesale, or limited-purpose bank. In addition, 
bank examiners take into account the nature of a bank’s 
business and the markets in which it operates. In a trad-
able obligation regime, however, the nature of the bank’s 
business, its market, and the location of its operations 
would be less important than they are under the current 
approach. Because a bank could pay another bank to 
perform its CRA obligations, the obligations would not 
have to be tailored to each bank. Market trades would 
replace regulatory tailoring in matching banks’ capabili-
ties with CRA-qualified communities. 
In addition, some customization of a bank’s obliga-
tion would be possible. Rather than evaluating a bank’s 
performance retrospectively, an examiner could make 
essentially the same assessment but use his analysis to 
prescribe a prospective obligation. For elements of CRA 
obligations that are not fully specified by regulation, 
the examiner would specify the bank’s annual obliga-
tions in objective terms. Individual specification would 
depend on the needs of the community and the estimated 
costs of meeting those needs rather than the capabili-
ties of the bank that is assigned the obligation.6 A bank’s 
annual obligation would remain constant until the next 
examination. 
The mix between generalized and individualized 
obligations is a detail that would have to be worked out 
with experience. We might discover, for example, that 
the CRA’s lending and investment requirements are more 
suitable for generalized quantification than is the service 
requirement. If so, lending and investment obligations 
could be set out more specifically by regulation, and the 
service obligation could be specified more individually 
by examiners. 
 The second element of a tradable obligation ap-
proach would be trading. Any bank would be allowed 
to pay another bank to take on its CRA obligations, in 
whole or in part. If Bank A can meet some or all of Bank 
B’s CRA obligations, then Bank B could pay Bank A to 
do so. By allowing banks to pay others to take on their 
CRA obligations, a market for acquiring these obliga-
tions would develop. Some banks would choose to be 
suppliers of CRA services, others would choose to be 
buyers, and some might choose to be both. For example, 
a bank might make its requisite volume of CRA-qualified 
loans itself and take payments from other banks to make 
additional loans, but the same bank might pay other 
banks to fulfill its investment and service obligations 
under the CRA. Or a bank might make loans amount-
ing to one-half its lending obligations and pay others to 
make the rest. As discussed below, maximum liquidity 
would argue for nationwide trading, but an interest in 
geographic distribution of CRA services would argue for 
trading within defined regions. 
The tradable obligation approach, if successful, 
would harness market forces to promote better service 
to CRA-qualified communities at lower cost. Those 
banks that establish expertise in serving one or more 
CRA-qualifying communities could well see business 
opportunities in taking on other banks’ CRA obligations. 
Other banks would impose a market discipline on these 
specialists by transferring their obligations to the low-
est bidder and by providing CRA services themselves 
when opportunities arise that are less costly than paying 
another bank to do the job. The result would be markets 
for CRA services, with prices for CRA obligations estab-
lished by supply and demand among banks. 
This approach to the CRA mirrors the emissions 
trading approach provided for under the Environmental 
Protection Agency’s Acid Rain Program, and cap-and-
trade regimes that have been adopted to address car-
bon emissions. In the Acid Rain Program, polluters are 
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assigned quotas for the emission of sulfur dioxide and 
nitrogen dioxide. If a polluter can reduce its emission 
of one of these pollutants below its quota, it can sell the 
unused portion of its quota to another polluter for cash. 
Conversely, if a polluter wants to emit more than its 
quota, it must buy the unused quota of another polluter. 
Under this system, polluters have incentives to develop 
technologies and processes that produce high output for 
each unit of pollution emitted. Under the CRA proposal 
outlined above, banks would have similar financial in-
centives to meet the needs of low- and moderate-income 
communities. 
II.  Multiple Rationales for Tradable  
Obligations
The potential advantages of a CRA trading regime 
stem from three sources: the allocation of CRA obliga-
tions to banks best able to fulfill them; the promotion 
of specialization in serving CRA-qualified communi-
ties; and increased concentrations of lenders in CRA-
qualified communities. Specialization and concentra-
tion could promote cost efficiencies, internalization of 
information-based market imperfections, and internaliza-
tion of physical neighborhood externalities associated 
with CRA-qualified services. 
A.  Wealth Redistribution and the “Leaky Bucket”
To the extent that the objective of the CRA is to 
redistribute wealth from bank shareholders to residents 
of low- and moderate-income communities, the second-
ary objective should be to do so at minimal social cost. 
As Arthur Okun observed, when wealth is redistributed 
from rich to poor, there will be a social cost involved, so 
that $10 taken from the rich does not mean a full $10 
given to the poor. There will be some leakage. In Okun’s 
terms, any redistribution occurs via a “leaky bucket.” 
Good public policy requires mechanisms that minimize 
the leakage.7
In the case of the CRA, if one bank is poorly 
equipped to provide financial services to CRA-qualified 
communities and another bank is well equipped to pro-
vide those services, then the cost of the redistribution will 
be lower if the latter bank does the job. One bank may 
be better than another at providing CRA-eligible services 
because of the experience and skills of its employees, or 
because of the nature of its other businesses. This is in 
stark contrast to the current approach to the CRA, which 
requires all banks to provide CRA-eligible services. 
A tradable obligation regime would use market 
forces to allocate CRA responsibility to the banks able to 
provide CRA services at the lowest cost. In addition, as 
discussed below, it would promote the achievement of 
additional efficiencies for banks that choose to become 
providers of CRA services. 
B.  Asymmetric Information and Credit Rationing
The CRA responds to market imperfections as well 
and therefore has an allocative efficiency rationale in 
addition to a redistributive rationale. One market imper-
fection is the inherently asymmetric information between 
a lender and borrower. This asymmetry can lead to 
“credit rationing,” a dynamic in which a lender rationally 
declines to make loans to particular groups of potential 
borrowers at any interest rate.8 Low- and moderate-in-
come communities are especially at risk of experiencing 
credit rationing. The CRA, as now implemented, responds 
to this problem by forcing banks to lend, but a CRA with 
tradable obligations may respond more effectively.9
When a bank makes a loan, it does so based on 
information regarding the default risk of the borrower. 
Borrowers, however, have better information regarding 
their default risk than the bank has, and the bank knows 
this. The bank can reduce this information asymmetry 
by making detailed, individualized lending decisions 
and setting interest rates on an individualized basis, but 
doing so is costly and may not be justified by the bank’s 
expected return on loans. Therefore, banks always rely to 
some degree on aggregate determinations; they charge 
interest rates that reflect the average default risk of a type 
of borrower—based, for instance, on the borrower’s cur-
rent assets and income and on the size of the loan.
Credit rationing occurs when a lender must make 
lending decisions based largely on default-risk charac-
teristics of a group of potential borrowers, rather than 
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the default risk of individuals in the group span a wide 
range. When a bank sets an interest rate for a certain 
type, or pool, of borrowers, some members of the pool 
will inevitably be overcharged with respect to their ac-
tual default risk, and others will be undercharged. Loans 
across the full range of borrowers in the pool should 
yield a risk-adjusted return for the bank in the aggregate. 
But especially if the divergence of risk within the pool is 
large, there is a danger that those who are less risky will 
decline the higher rate loan and seek alternatives such as 
rental housing rather than homeownership. If this occurs, 
the composition and therefore the average default risk 
of the pool as a whole will increase, and the bank will 
have to increase the interest rate it charges to borrowers 
remaining in the pool. This adverse selection spiral can 
continue to a point at which the increased revenue that 
would come from raising the interest rate further is more 
than offset by the increased default risk of borrowers 
that remain in the pool. If the bank believes that this will 
occur, it will rationally choose not to make loans at all to 
any borrower in the pool.10 
The danger of credit rationing is substantial for low- 
and moderate-income communities. Credit rationing 
occurs because the cost to the lender of distinguishing 
between high- and low-risk borrowers is not worth the 
gain. Credit analysis entails fixed costs in assessing and 
monitoring the economic conditions of a neighborhood 
and becoming familiar with the neighborhood’s residents 
and businesses. These costs are reflected in empirial 
evidence of economies of scale in lending within 
neighborhoods.11 There are also significant fixed costs in 
evaluating any single loan application and monitoring 
repayment. The costs associated with a $50,000 loan are 
not very different from those associated with a $500,000 
loan. Moreover, in CRA-qualifying communities, credit 
analysis and loan servicing is more costly than in other 
neighborhoods. Borrowers are less likely to have prior 
borrowing experience and are more likely to need as-
sistance in making loan applications and repaying their 
loans. Information regarding their creditworthiness may 
not conform to the standards that banks use to assess 
creditworthiness in other parts of their business, and the 
response to a default may need to be different from the 
response in other settings.12 These heightened fixed costs 
of lending in CRA communities must be spread over a 
relatively low volume of small loans.13 Consequently, 
these communities are particularly vulnerable to credit 
rationing.
 The CRA responds to the danger of credit rationing 
by forcing banks to make loans in low- and moderate-
income communities. But by requiring banks to spread 
their services throughout the areas in which they oper-
ate, the current approach deters specialization in par-
ticular neighborhoods. Consequently, gains that might 
come from familiarity with a neighborhood and from 
economies of scale within a neighborhood are lost.
A tradable obligation approach to the CRA could 
respond more effectively to the asymmetric information 
problem by encouraging banks to specialize in lend-
ing to particular neighborhoods and using other banks’ 
CRA obligations to lend in higher volumes in those 
neighborhoods, thereby developing economies of scale. 
Such specialized banks could develop the capacity to 
make more precise, individualized risk assessments and 
thereby avoid credit rationing. In addition, with higher 
volume, they could spread the fixed cost of serving a 
community over a greater volume of loans.
C.  Information Externalities
A second market imperfection that affects lending 
is the presence of positive externalities that flow from 
information associated with past loans. Especially when 
making home loans, banks rely on appraisals, which are 
dependent on past sales of similar properties. Past sales, 
however, exist only because financing was available to 
earlier home buyers—and of course the appraisals that 
supported those earlier sales were based on yet earlier 
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continuous series of comparable home sales.14 
If home sales in a community are interrupted or their 
volume is substantially reduced, for whatever reason, a 
self-reinforcing dynamic can occur in which loans that 
should be made are not made, and sales that should 
occur do not occur. In order to support an appraisal on 
a home or other piece of real estate, an appraiser needs 
several recent comparable sales in the same community. 
Without those comparable sales, the appraisal will be 
less reliable and a lender may not finance the purchase 
at the seller’s asking price. Unless the buyer can make 
up the difference with cash, or the seller reduces the 
price, the sale will fall through. The result is a further 
slowdown in sales and a concomitant reduction in 
information to fuel lending for future sales. This self-
reinforcing decline in sales can occur regardless of the 
fundamental value of homes in a neighborhood or the 
potential of the local economy. What would otherwise 
be a transient decline in sales becomes a protracted 
period of illiquidity and decline in real estate values. 
Making the situation even worse, physical deterioration 
may occur as would-be sellers defer upkeep and leave 
homes and shops vacant. 
Appraisals are used in some commercial lending as 
well, but in addition, banks monitor their outstanding 
loans to acquire information regarding business condi-
tions in a community. That information is used to make 
current loan determinations. Consequently, once com-
mercial lending dries up in a community, there will be 
an impediment to reviving it, and a downward spiral can 
occur just as in the housing market.15
Downward spirals stemming from what otherwise 
would be transient slowdowns can occur in any market, 
but low- and moderate-income communities are espe-
cially vulnerable. Home buyers in these communities 
are less likely to have additional cash to make up the 
shortfall between the amount a bank is willing to loan 
and the price a seller is willing to accept. Similarly, busi-
nesses are less likely to have the internal funds to fill a 
shortfall in commercial lending. Regulatory intervention, 
therefore, could be beneficial.
The CRA responds to the danger of such a downward 
spiral by forcing banks to make loans. But, again, in con-
trast to a tradable obligation approach, the CRA requires 
banks to spread their activities throughout the area in 
which they operate. As a result, it deters specialization 
and market concentration, both of which can reduce the 
impact of lost information externalities that occur as a 
result of a slowdown in home sales and lending. A bank 
is more likely to learn about a neighborhood, and will 
have more sources of information, if it can concentrate 
resources there as opposed to spreading those same 
resources across all areas in which it operates. The bank 
will therefore be less dependent on information flow-
ing from a continuous stream of past home sales and 
commercial loans. Furthermore, if a bank has a larger 
market share in a neighborhood, it will reap more of 
the positive information externalities that it produces 
by continuing to lend despite a slowdown in sales. 
Because a tradable obligation approach to the CRA 
would promote specialization and concentration, it has 
the potential to reduce the vulnerability of low- and 
moderate-income communities to local interruptions in 
sales and lending.
D.  Neighborhood Externalities
In addition to information-related market imperfec-
tions, there are physical externalities that can impair 
lending in low- and moderate-income communities. 
The value of any property is dependent on the condition 
of neighboring properties. Thus, the deterioration of a 
neighborhood will reduce the value of even well-main-
tained properties. Consequently, a lender may decline to 
make loans in a neighborhood that is in decline or that it 
fears will go into decline, regardless of the quality of par-
ticular homes being offered for sale or the creditworthi-
ness of particular loan applicants. A reduction in lending 
will exacerbate the deterioration. Conversely, lending 
can have positive externalities on a neighborhood, as 
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Once again, the CRA responds to this problem with 
forced lending across a bank’s entire assessment area. 
Forced lending can help, but it would help more if a 
bank could concentrate its lending on particular neigh-
borhoods and thereby internalize the positive externali-
ties of continued lending. 
A tradable obligation regime would promote con-
centration within neighborhoods. Consequently, it 
could allow banks to lend in sufficient volume within a 
neighborhood to internalize at least some neighborhood 
externalities that their own lending creates.
E.  Summary
As discussed in Section IV, there are a number of ca-
veats and questions that must be addressed before a trad-
able obligation regime for the CRA ought to be adopted. 
Leaving those issues aside for the moment, however, the 
potential virtue of a tradable obligation approach to the 
CRA is that market forces would be harnessed to accom-
plish several objectives. First, the most efficient provid-
ers of financial services to low- and moderate-income 
communities would emerge in each community. Second, 
banks that serve a particular CRA-qualified community 
would tend to specialize in that community. Third, there 
would be a greater concentration in banks serving par-
ticular CRA-qualified communities, meaning that each 
bank would provide a higher volume of service than it 
does under current law. 
As a result of this specialization and concentration, 
banks would be well positioned to make more indi-
vidualized credit decisions and thereby avoid credit 
rationing. They would also internalize the information 
externalities generated by their own lending and thereby 
better weather periods of illiquidity. Further, by bearing 
a greater cost of physical neighborhood externalities 
and reaping a greater benefit from positive externali-
ties associated with lending, banks serving a commu-
nity would have a greater stake in averting its physical 
deterioration and more to gain by working to promote its 
rehabilitation.
III.  Developments Since the 1990s
I originally proposed this tradable obligation ap-
proach to the CRA in 1994. The question now is whether 
anything has changed that makes it worth further consid-
eration. Part III discusses developments since the 1990s 
that potentially make the proposal more attractive than 
it was in the 1990s, while Part IV discusses continuing 
concerns.
A.  The Effect of Out-of-Area Lending
The CRA, enacted in 1977, was designed for a bank-
ing industry in which a bank’s market is largely local 
and defined by the areas in which the bank has brick 
and mortar branches at which it collects deposits. A 
bank’s obligation under the CRA is to meet the needs 
of low- and moderate-income communities where the 
bank is physically located. Since the CRA’s enactment, 
its geographic orientation has become increasingly ill-
suited to the evolving banking market.17 Today, the area 
in which a bank makes loans is often quite different from 
the areas in which the bank has branches or even ATMs. 
Yet a bank’s assessment area for CRA purposes is still 
based on the physical locations from which it collects 
deposits (including ATMs). Consequently, the impact of 
the CRA is relatively weak in areas that receive relatively 
high volumes of out-of-area bank loans.
A tradable obligation approach to the CRA could 
avoid this problem by broadly defining the region, or 
assessment area, for which a bank has CRA obligations. 
That region could extend beyond the areas in which the 
bank is physically located. Because a bank would not be 
required to perform all CRA services itself, and because 
trading would be permitted within assessment areas, a 
larger assessment area would provide for a more liquid 
market for CRA obligations. 
B.  Mortgage Lending by Nonbanks
Another change that has occurred since 1977 is the 
dramatic expansion of the mortgage lending market to 
include institutions other than banks. The CRA applies 
only to banks, which at the time of enactment were the 
primary providers of home loans. Today, however, mort-
gage brokers and mortgage bankers originate more loans 
than banks. Thus the CRA has applied to a relatively 
small fraction of the home loan market.
The CRA in its current form could be expanded to 
nonbank mortgage lenders. But to the extent that some 
of these lenders are not well suited to serve low- and 
17  For a discussion, see “The 25th Anniversary of the Community Reinvestment Act: Access to Capital in an Evolving Financial Services System,” a 
report	of	The	Joint	Center	for	Housing	Studies,	Harvard	University	(2002),	15,	27–31.	For	a	contrary	view,	see	Barr,	“Credit	Where	It	Counts,	513.	Revisiting the CRA: Perspectives on the Future of the Community Reinvestment Act
81
moderate-income communities, it would be more cost 
effective to allow these institutions to transfer their CRA 
obligations to institutions that can fulfill them more 
efficiently.
C.  The Growth of Community Development  
     Financial Institutions
Another element that could make a tradable CRA 
obligation regime attractive is the growth of Community 
Development Financial Institutions (CDFIs) across the 
country.18 CDFIs provide a wide range of financial 
services in lower-income communities, including 
services that banks provide under the CRA. The CRA 
has helped fuel the growth of CDFIs by inducing banks 
to finance them and to collaborate with them in serving 
CRA-qualified communities. 
A tradable obligation regime could potentially 
enhance collaboration with CDFIs and enhance the 
delivery of financial services to the communities in 
which they operate. First, CDFIs could enter the market 
for tradable obligations and take on banks’ CRA obliga-
tions. This could be an ideal case of a specialized bank 
taking over the CRA obligations of other banks and 
providing better service to the community. Most CDFIs 
are not banks, which raises the question whether non-
banks should be able to enter the market for taking on 
banks’ CRA obligations. One concern would be a lack 
of regulatory follow-up to ensure that the obligations are 
fulfilled. If a transferee of CRA obligations is a bank, its 
examiner could ensure that it has fulfilled all obligations 
that it takes on. There may be a reason, therefore, to limit 
the market for CRA obligations to banks. But once this 
market exists, more CDFIs might well become banks in 
order to go into the business of taking on CRA obliga-
tions and thereby expanding their services.19
A CDFI would need additional capital to fund 
expanded services. Some of that capital would come 
from amounts paid by banks that transfer their CRA 
obligations to the CDFI. But more would be needed. 
That additional capital could come from collaboration 
with banks. For example, a CDFI might enter into an 
arrangement with a bank in which the CDFI takes on 
some of the bank’s obligations and, in addition, assists 
the bank in making loans that would allow the bank to 
fulfill some of its own CRA obligations. Alternatively, the 
bank could make a large equity investment in a CDFI, 
fulfilling its own investment obligation under the CRA 
and perhaps those of transferor banks as well. Collabora-
tion with CDFIs can count toward a bank’s CRA rating 
under the current system, but by allowing banks to focus 
on particular neighborhoods rather than spreading their 
CRA activities throughout their assessment area, a trad-
able obligation approach would allow a CDFI to work 
with fewer banks with higher volume from each. The 
transaction costs of this arrangement may be less than 
the transaction costs of working with many banks, each 
of which devotes fewer resources to the relationship. 
With a CDFI as the hub of a financial service network in 
a community, the problems of information asymmetry, 
information externalities, and neighborhood externalities 
could be addressed in much the same way that South 
Shore Bank addressed those problems when working 
alone on Chicago’s South Side in the 1980s.20
IV. Caveats and Questions
Although a tradable obligation approach to the CRA 
has the theoretical potential to enhance the delivery of 
financial services to low- and moderate-income commu-
nities, legitimate questions can be raised regarding how 
the program would be implemented in practice. This 
section briefly raises some of those questions.
A.  Objective Description and Quantification  
      of CRA Obligations
A tradable obligation regime would require 
objectively specified CRA obligations. One question 
that should be investigated is the extent to which 
this can be accomplished. As described above, each 
bank’s CRA obligations need not be fully defined by 
regulation. Instead, bank examiners could specify a 
bank’s obligations at the time of examination, much as 
they do today in evaluating a bank’s past performance. 
Nonetheless, even if individually specified, each bank’s 
obligations would have to be specified objectively. For 
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would be necessary. First, a bank that has transferred 
a CRA obligation would need clarity with respect to 
how much of its entire set of CRA obligations it has 
transferred and what obligations remain. (This would 
be true as well when a bank performs a CRA obligation 
itself.) Second, a transferee bank would need clarity 
regarding what it must do at the margin beyond 
performing its own CRA obligations in order to fulfill the 
obligations transferred. Third, the CRA examiner would 
need clarity with respect to what has occurred in order 
to verify that the trade resulted in the transferee bank 
actually fulfilling the transferor bank’s CRA obligation. 
For a quantifiable obligation, such as an obligation to 
make loans, these conditions may be relatively easy to 
meet. But for a less quantifiable CRA service, it may be 
more difficult to ensure that a trade is adding services at 
the margin. 
Ideally, all types of CRA obligations would be objec-
tively specified in order to allow them to be traded. But 
if this is not possible, a tradable obligation regime that 
extends to only some types of CRA obligations, such as 
lending or investment obligations, could be an improve-
ment over the current regime.
B.  Liquidity
In theory, CRA trading would occur on an active mar-
ket, with prices of certain types of obligations—loans in 
a particular community, for example—readily discover-
able. Intermediaries could well emerge to facilitate these 
trades, as they have in the acid rain and carbon emis-
sion contexts. But there surely will be frictions, and it is 
unclear how liquid this market would be. If many banks 
choose not to trade, the market would be illiquid, which 
of course would further impede trading, and the poten-
tial benefit would be lost. There is no way to know how 
much trading would occur until one tries to implement 
the system, but some valuable information could be ob-
tained by simply surveying potential buyers and sellers 
of CRA obligations regarding how they would expect to 
respond to a trading regime.
C.  Geographic Coverage
The CRA in its current form reflects an ambition that 
all low- and moderate-income communities be served. 
A bank’s performance under the CRA is evaluated with 
respect to geographic distribution of the bank’s service 
to CRA-qualified communities throughout its assessment 
area. As discussed above, this requirement is counterpro-
ductive in certain respects. Nonetheless, it does address 
a concern that communities not be left out.
It is unclear how effectively this concern would be 
met under a tradable obligation regime. In the extreme, 
if banks’ CRA obligations had no geographic ties, there 
would be a danger that less attractive CRA-qualified 
communities across the country would not be served. To 
the extent that the profit motive drives the market, banks 
would emerge to serve the low- and moderate-income 
communities that offer the greatest profit potential (or 
lowest loss potential), and the supply of such services 
would expand to less profitable communities (or those 
where the greatest losses are feared) up to the point 
at which the nationwide stock of CRA obligations is 
exhausted. The aggregate quantity of CRA obligations 
could be increased in order to fill in geographic gaps 
in coverage. But this would be a blunt policy instru-
ment. Instead, the danger of geographic gaps could be 
addressed by imposing a geographic constraint within 
a trading regime. For example, the country could be 
divided into regional trading markets, and banks that 
operate within a region could be required to trade only 
within that region. The imposition of geographic limits 
would reduce the liquidity of the market, but trading 
regions could still be large. It is impossible to know in 
advance the trade-off between geographic distribution 
of CRA services and the liquidity of the CRA market. 
This would have to be determined and adjusted with 
experience.
D.  Antitrust 
A theme repeated throughout this proposal is that a 
tradable obligation approach to the CRA would promote 
concentration of lending markets within CRA-qualified 
neighborhoods. Concentration would promote internal-
ization of externalities and achievement of economies 
of scale. But concentration could also lead to antitrust 
concerns. With CRA examiners periodically present and 
community groups organized to scrutinize banks’ perfor-
mance, this may not turn out to be a problem, but it is a 
potential danger of this proposal. 
E.  A Pilot
Some of the questions raised here and others that 
surely could be raised might be answered in the abstract. 
Others, however, can be answered only with experience. 
A pilot program, perhaps limited to a single region, might 
be a reasonable step toward determining whether a trad-Revisiting the CRA: Perspectives on the Future of the Community Reinvestment Act
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able obligation approach might enhance the delivery of 
services to low- and moderate-income communities.
V.  Conclusion
A tradable obligation approach to the CRA has some 
promise of responding better to market failures in CRA-
qualified communities than does the current command-
and-control approach. It also may be a more efficient 
means of accomplishing the CRA’s redistributive goals. 
The growth of mortgage lending by nonbanks and by 
banks operating outside the areas in which they have 
physical facilities also militates in favor of a tradable obli-
gation approach. Nonbank mortgage lenders are not cur-
rently covered by the CRA, and extending the CRA in its 
current form to these institutions may be infeasible. But 
imposing on them CRA obligations that they can transfer 
to others would have fewer obstacles. Finally, a trad-
able obligation approach to CRA may complement the 
growth of CDFIs over the past decade. Some CDFIs could 
become transferees of CRA obligations and increase their 
impact on communities. Others could facilitate transfers 
among banks and work with transferee banks on a larger 
scale than they do under the current CRA regime. 
Without a doubt, this would be a radical reform. I 
have raised several issues that would have to be ad-
dressed before one could be sanguine about its success. 
On balance, the approach seems attractive enough to 
warrant consideration of those issues, as well as others 
that surely would arise if it were adopted, in order to as-
sess the viability of this approach to the CRA.   
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